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1. Introduction
The performance of inflation-targeting regimes around the world has
been positive. Average inflation in both emerging markets and devel-
oped economies is substantially lower after the adoption of the inflation-
targeting regime than immediately before its adoption (Figure I).1
However, emerging market economies (EMEs) have had a relatively
worse performance. In these countries, deviations from both central tar-
gets and upper bounds are larger and more common.2 This outcome sug-
gests that either inflation targeters in EMEs are less committed to their
targets or inflation targeting in these countries is a more challenging task
than in developed ones. The latter explanation is related to the more
volatile macroeconomic environment and to weaker institutions and cred-
ibility in these countries, which in turn lead to more acute trade-offs than
the existing ones in developed economies.
We thank the participants in the NBER Eighteenth Annual Conference on Macroeconomics,
especially Mark Gertler, Robert Hall, Frederic Mishkin, and Kenneth Rogoff, and seminar
participants at Princeton University for their comments. We are also grateful to Fabia A. de
Carvalho, Eduardo Loyo, and Marcio I. Nakane for their suggestions; to Thais P. Ferreira and
Myrian B. S. Petrassi for research assistance; and to Marcileide A. da Silva, Pedro H. S. de
Sousa, and Raquel K. de S. Tsukada for assistance with data. The views expressed are those
of the authors and not necessarily those of the Banco Central do Brasil.
1. Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999); Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002); and
Corbo, Landerretche, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) have found evidence of additional gains
stemming from inflation targeting. Ball and Sheridan (2003) have found no evidence that
inflation-targeting countries have enjoyed better performance in the OECD.
2. The deviations of inflation from central targets and from the upper bounds of targets
were 81% and 167% higher than in developed economies, respectively (table available on
request to the authors).
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Under inflation targeting, EMEs have the challenge of breaking the
vicious circle between, on one side, low credibility and more fragile insti-
tutions and, on the other side, higher macroeconomic instability and vul-
nerability to external shocks. It is a long process that involves acquiring
credibility as a monetary policy institution committed to price stability in
the context of higher instability.
This paper assesses inflation targeting in EMEs compared to that in
developed economies and develops applied prescriptions for the conduct
of monetary policy and inflation-targeting design. We verify that EMEs
have faced more acute trade-offs than developed countries have: both
output and inflation are more volatile, and the inflation level is higher.
The explanation for the different performance of EMEs relies on the pres-
ence of more fragile institutions and imperfect credibility, and on the
nature and magnitude of the shocks that hit these economies.
There are several instances where these more acute trade-offs emerge.
Take the case of a sudden stop in the inflow of capital to an EME leading
to a substantial depreciation of the currency (e.g., in 2002, Brazil was faced
with a negative swing of US$30 billion—or 6% of gross domestic product
(GDP)—in capital flows relative to an already difficult 2001, which led to
a nominal depreciation of 50%). Even in a context of good initial condi-
tions—low pass-through and 12-month forward inflation expectations on
track—this event led to a breach of the inflation target and, given some
inertia, to a worsening of both inflation expectations and actual future
inflation (Brazil's target of 4% was breached with an inflation of 12.5%,
and 12-month forward inflation expectations were 11.0% at the end of
Figure 1 INFLATION BEFORE AND AFTER ADOPTION OF INFLATION
TARGETING (IT)
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December 2002). In this context, what is the optimal response to these
types of shocks? Should one take 24 months or longer to converge to the
target, even when building credibility and reputation is still important?
In general, in the more volatile environment in EMEs, some applied
and theoretical issues deserve attention. (1) How can the country build
credibility when faced with larger shocks? And how can it balance
flexibility and credibility in such an instance? (2) How does an infla-
tion-targeting regime work in a disinflation process? And in a credibility-
building process? (3) How can a country deal with shocks that represent
important changes in relative prices? (4) Should bands be wider and the
central points of inflation targets be higher in EMEs? (5) How should
International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality be designed with an
inflation-targeting country?
This paper discusses these monetary policy issues. Its focus, therefore,
is more applied. For that purpose, our analysis is based on empirical find-
ings for EMEs and, in particular, on our own experience at the Banco
Central do Brasil (BCB), besides the use of simulations of a model to guide
our discussions. In a way, because the case of Brazil represents the first
stress test of an inflation-targeting regime, the lessons learned may some-
day be useful for other countries.
We stress the role of communication and transparency as crucial for the
process of building credibility. This paper lays out the main issues and, as a
by-product, also includes two applied proposals. The first is a transparent
procedure that a central bank under inflation targeting can apply and com-
municate when facing strong supply shocks. The second is a design of a mon-
itoring structure for an inflation-targeting regime under an IMF program.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts
about EMEs and developed countries. It contains a statistical comparison of
the conduct and results of monetary policy in EMEs and developed coun-
tries. Section 3 presents a theoretical model of a small open economy, which
is employed to simulate the effects of some shocks and changes in inflation
targets. Section 4 discusses some reasons why EMEs face higher volatility. It
analyzes the challenge of constructing credibility and reducing inflation lev-
els, analyzes the effect of large external shocks, and addresses issues on fis-
cal and financial dominance. Section 5 addresses how to deal with shocks.
2. Stylized Facts About Inflation Targeting in Emerging
Market Economies
In this section we present basic stylized facts comparing the volatilities of
inflation, output, exchange rates, and interest rates, and the average of
inflation and output growth in emerging markets and developed
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Table 1 INITIAL TARGETS AND INFLATION AROUND ADOPTION OF
INFLATION TARGETING (12-MONTH ACCUMULATED INFLATION)
Date of
adoption
inflation
targeting
Developed economies
Australia
Canada
Iceland
New Zealand
Norway-
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Average
Median
Apr 1993
Feb 1991
Mar 2001 2.
Mar 1990
Mar 2001
Jan 1993
Jan 2000
Oct 1992
Emerging market economies
Brazil1
Chile
Colombia
Czech Republic
Hungary
Israel
Mexico
Peru
Poland
South Africa2
South Korea
Thailand
Average
Median
Jun 1999
Jan 1991
Sep 1999
Jan 1998
Jun 2001
Jan 1992
Jan 1991
Jan 1994
Oct 1998
Feb 2000
Jan 1998
Apr 2000
First target
2% - 3%
3% - 5%
Inflation
right before
IT adoption
1.22
6.83
.5% (-1.5%+ 3.5%) 4.05
3% - 5%
2.5
2% (± 1%)
<2%
1% - 4%
2.8
2.5
8% (± 2%)
15% - 20%
15%
5.5% - 6.5%
7% (±1%)
14% - 1 5 %
<13%
15% - 20%
<9.5%
3% - 6%
9%(±1%)
0% - 3.5%
10.3
9.3
7.03
3.64
1.76
1.63
3.57
3.72
3.61
3.15
27.31
9.22
9.98
10.78
18.03
18.61
39.49
10.44
2.65
6.57
1.04
13.11
10.21
Inflation
12 months
after
IT adoption
1.7A
1.68
8.72
4.52
1.10
1.70
0.90
1.35
2.71
1.69
6.51
19.47
9.35
3.5
4.87
10.74
11.03
13.71
8.82
7.77
1.46
2.47
8.31
8.30
1. In Brazil, the inflation of the period previous to the adoption of inflation targeting was in part a result
of the overappreciation of the domestic currency.
2. First target established for 2002.
economies.3 We have faced two difficulties in defining the differences
between the two country groups. First, some differences exist across
EMEs; therefore, not all characteristics that we list are common to all these
economies. Because they are present in a significant part of the group,
however, we call them stylized facts. Second, in most EMEs, the adoption
of inflation targeting is recent, making it difficult to draw conclusions and
to apply econometric methods. Table 1 shows the dates of adoption for
3. The assessment of the experiences of some countries and of some issues involved in the
design of inflation targeting can be found in Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999);
Truman (2003); Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002); Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002);
Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001); and Minella, Freitas, Goldfajn, and Muinhos (2002).
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Table 2 VOLATILITY AND AVERAGE OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR
1997:1-2002:2
Countries
Volatility of basic variables
Inflation
Developed economies
Australia
Canada
Iceland
New Zealand
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Average
Median
2.05
0.83
2.45
1.21
0.77
1.11
0.54
0.92
1.24
1.02
Emerging market economies
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Czech Republic
Hungary
Israel
Mexico
Peru
Poland
South Africa
South Korea
Thailand
Average
Median
2.09
1.30
5.43
3.46
4.09
3.18
5.98
3.04
4.13
2.13
2.36
3.25
3.37
3.22
Exchange
rate*
0.13
0.04
0.15
0.16
0.10
0.12
0.08
0.06
0.11
0.11
0.15*
0.17
0.25
0.09
0.16
0.10
0.07
0.11
0.11
0.26
0.14
0.14
0.15
0.14
GDP
growth*
1.96
1.30
3.13
3.61
2.25
2.41
1.14
0.79
2.07
2.11
2.06
3.25
3.38
2.73
—
3.36
3.17
3.45
2.40
1.11
6.38
6.13
3.40
3.25
Interest
rate
0.58
1.14
3.02
1.47
1.46
0.44
0.92
1.13
1.27
1.13
7.06
—
10.02
5.81
1.13
3.34
7.26
5.50
4.14
3.65
5.52
6.72
5.47
5.52
Average
GDP
growth
4.78
3.57
4.17
3.09
2.66
2.58
1.79
2.61
3.16
2.88
1.81
3.11
0.81
1.81
—
2.98
4.05
2.11
3.85
2.26
4.31
0.08
2.41
2.26
Inflation
5.89
1.96
4.05
1.65
2.44
1.24
0.85
2.46
2.57
2.20
5.89
3.88
12.51
5.31
11.21
4.35
11.72
3.89
8.40
6.51
3.73
2.88
6.69
5.60
Data source: International Financial Statistics, IMF (quarterly data).
* The coefficient of variation (standard deviation/average).
+
 Growth rate measured comparing the current quarter to the quarter of the previous year.
*The period 1999:1-2002:2. For 1997:1-2002:2, the value is 0.31.
emerging and developed economies. The number of inflation targeters
among developing and developed economies amounts to 12 and 8,
respectively. Most of the developed countries adopted inflation targeting
between 1990 and 1993, whereas the majority of the developing countries
adopted it from 1998 onward.
We consider two samples. The first refers to the period after the
adoption of inflation targeting in each country. The objective is to com-
pare countries with the same regime. Because the periods across coun-
tries are different, however, the world macroeconomic environment is
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Figure 2 VOLATILITIES OF SELECTED VARIABLES OF THE PERIOD
1997-2002 (AVERAGE OF STANDARD DEVIATION)
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different as well. Then we consider a second sample that refers to a
recent period, which includes Asian, Brazilian, and Russian crises: 1997
to mid-2002, which we refer to as a fixed sample. In this case, some
countries are inflation targeters in the whole sample, whereas others
are just in part of it. Table 2 and Figure 2 record the data for the second
sample.4
In both samples, the data indicate that, in comparison to developed
economies, the volatilities of all variables (inflation, the exchange rate,5
output, and the interest rate) and the inflation level are higher in EMEs.
The more challenging trade-off faced by EMEs is illustrated in Figure 3,
which shows the combination of the variability of output growth and
inflation for each country for 1997:1 to 2002:2.
3. Model
We develop a small open economy model to illustrate the main points raised
in the paper. The objective is to simulate the effects of some shocks and
changes in inflation targets. The model combines features of Batini, Harrison,
and Millard's (2003) and McCallum and Nelson's (2000) formulations.
Imports enter as intermediate goods, in contrast to most of the
open economy literature, which typically uses a model with imports as
consumption goods. As stressed by McCallum and Nelson (2000), a
4. The data referring to the first sample is available on request to the authors.
5. For the inflation-targeting sample, the measured exchange-rate volatility is similar.
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Figure 3 TRADE-OFF VOLATILITIES OF OUTPUT AND INFLATION (1997:1-2002:2)
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specification where imports are entered as intermediate goods captures
better the features of the data. In comparison to models where imports
enter as consumption goods, such as in Gali and Monacelli (2002),
McCallum and Nelson's (2000) model generates a lower and more
delayed correlation between exchange-rate changes and the inflation
rate, closer to that observed in the data. Furthermore, intermediate
goods are the major items in imports. Table 3 records the share in
imports of goods classified by use for five countries. On average, con-
sumption goods represent only 21.3% of the total imports, whereas cap-
ital and intermediate goods shares are 29.5% and 46.2%, respectively.
Because no imported consumption goods are included in the model,
there is no distinction between domestic and consumer price index
(CPI) inflation, which is different from Svensson (2000) and Gali and
Monacelli (2002).
The model is derived from the optimization of infinitely lived house-
holds and firms. We present directly the log approximation of the vari-
ables around the nonstochastic flexible-price steady state. Lowercase
variables represent log-deviations from their steady-state values.6 We
present here only the most important equations of the model.7 The economy is
6. xt = log(X() - log(X,ss), where Xfss is the steady-state value for Xt, and log is the natural log-
arithm. Because log(l + rt) ~ rt, the lowercase variables represent percentage deviations
from the steady state.
7. The derivation of the model from the optimization of households and firms, and all the
equations resulting from the log-linearization are available on request to the authors.
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comprised of households, firms (owned by the households), and govern-
ment. Firms produce differentiated consumption goods using a Cobb-
Douglas production function:
yt = at + ant + (1 - a)mt (1)
where yt is output, at represents a stochastic productivity factor, nt is
(domestic) labor, and mt is imported goods.
Production is either consumed by domestic households or exported
(therefore, the economy exports consumption goods and imports inter-
mediate ones):
yt = scct + sxxt (2)
where ct is domestic consumption, xt is exports, sc = (1 - Xss/Yss), and
sx = Xss/Yss.
The aggregate demand equations are:
ct=Etct + 1-Yc(h-Etnt + 1) + ed (3)
xt=nqt + y? (4)
where it is the nominal interest rate; E, is the expectations operator; infla-
tion is nt = pt- pt_i, pt is the price level; y c is the inverse of the intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution for consumption; ect is a shock to preferences;
r\ is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods; qt
is the real exchange rate, defined as qt = st + p* - pt; st is the nominal
exchange rate, defined as the price in domestic currency of a unit of for-
eign currency; pf is the foreign price level; and yf is the output of the rest
Table 3 IMPORTS CLASSIFIED BY USE (2001)
Countries
Australia
Brazil
Chile
Mexico
New Zealand*
Simple Average
Consumption
30.2 %
12.8 %
19.8 %
19.8 %
24 %
21.3 %
Capital
21.3 %
26.6 %
21.0 %
57.7 %
21 %
29.5 %
Intermediate
(including fuel)
48.5 %
60.6 %
59.3 %
22.5 %
40 %
46.2 %
Total
100.0 %
100.0 %
100.0 %
100.0 %
85 %
*1999. Part of imports not classified by use.
Date source: Central banks and national institutes of statistics.
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of the world. The asterisk (*) indicates a variable of the rest of the world.
All variables of the rest of the world are treated as exogenous in the
model.
The model has domestic and foreign bonds, both private. Domestic
bonds are denominated in domestic currency and are held only by
domestic residents. Foreign bonds are denominated in foreign cur-
rency, and their prices include a stochastic country risk premium. The
derived uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIP) is presented
below:
it-i*=Etst + 1-st+^t (5)
where i* is the interest rate in the rest of the world, and £,t is the country
risk premium.
Firms maximize the difference between expected marginal revenue and
unit cost. There is price rigidity: only a fraction of the firms are allowed to
adjust prices each period. The choice of the optimum price for the firm
yields nt = (3Et KM + Xvu where (3 is a discount factor, and vt is the real unit
cost given by:8
vt=awt+(l-a)pMt-at-pt (6)
where wt is wage, and pMt is the price of imports in domestic currency,
defined as pm = st + p*m {p*m is the price of imports in foreign currency).
Note that inflation is affected by the exchange rate via the price of inter-
mediate goods.
Nevertheless, this formulation of the Phillips curve delivers some
counterfactual results, as stressed in Gali and Gertler (1999) and Fuhrer
(1997). It implies that current changes in inflation are negatively related
to the lagged output gap; that is, a positive output gap would lead to a
reduction in the inflation rate in the following period. In contrast, the
empirical evidence is that a positive output gap is followed by an
increase in the inflation rate over the cycle. Moreover this formulation
implies that, with perfectly credible announcements, a disinflation is
costless.
These empirical results have motivated some authors to work with a
hybrid Phillips curve: besides the expected inflation term, the equation
also contains a lagged term for inflation. In this paper, we do not
have a special concern about the specific derivation for the persistence in
8. X = Q — where 0 is the probability of the firm not adjusting its price in
period t.
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inflation.9 As in Gali and Gertler (1999), one possibility is to consider that
there is a fraction of backward-looking firms.10
In addition, we can also postulate a cost-push shock. This term could
reflect changes in the markup resulting from movements in the price elas-
ticity of demand over the cycle or in tax rates. It could also be used as a
proxy for the case of change in relative prices across sectors.11 The result-
ing aggregate supply equation is:
where yb + jf= 1.
We assume that the shocks follow stationary univariate autoregressive
processes of an order of 1.
The interest rate is the policy instrument. Monetary policy is given by a
Taylor-type simple rule or by optimal simple rules. In the latter, the opti-
mal coefficients are obtained by the minimization of the standard central
bank's intertemporal loss function that penalizes deviations of the output
gap (yt) and inflation from their targets:
(8)
where wy is related negatively to the aversion to inflation variability12 7i,T
is the inflation target, and yt = yt - yt (yt is the potential output, defined
as the output that would prevail in the case of full price flexibility). The
9. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) have generated inflation persistence assuming that agents care
about relative wages over the life of the wage contract. Roberts (1997, 1998) has found
some empirical evidence that expectations are less than perfectly rational: a fraction of
the agents would have adaptive expectations or there would be a partial adjustment of
expectations (these would adjust only gradually to the fully rational value). Gali and
Gertler (1999) have found that the fraction of backward-looking firms is statistically sig-
nificant, although not quantitatively important.
10. For simplification, we are assuming that X is not affected by the presence of the back-
ward-looking term.
11. For example, in the case of Brazil, there has been an important change in relative prices
in the last years that is only partially related to the exchange rate and the movement of
international prices.
12. In the simulations, we have considered different values for wy. We are not concerned
about the derivation of this parameter based on microfoundations. This objective func-
tion can be derived from a household utility function in the presence of price rigidity
(Rotemberg, and Woodford, 1999; Woodford, 2003). Woodford (2003) has also derived
the objective function in the case where prices are indexed to a lagged price index
between the occasions on which they are reoptimized. The objective function includes a
quasi-differenced inflation rate term rather than the inflation rate itself. We have used the
usual objective function based on the following grounds: (1) the objective function is
used only to get an idea of the optimal coefficients in the central bank's reaction function;
(2) in practice, this objective function seems to be used more often by central banks.
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interest rate is restricted to react to selected variables. We use the algo-
rithm in Dennis (2002) to estimate the optimal simple rule.13
4. Explaining the Higher Volatility
The conduct of monetary policy in EMEs faces at least three major chal-
lenges: (1) building credibility; (2) reducing the level of inflation; and (3)
dealing with fiscal, financial, and external dominance. The presence of
low credibility, inflation levels greater than the long-term goal, and large
shocks results in higher volatility of output, inflation, and the interest rate.
Fiscal and financial dominance issues also have implications for these
variables. In this section, we show how all these elements can help explain
the stylized facts presented previously. The explanation for the different
performance of EMEs relies on the presence of more fragile institutions
and imperfect credibility, on the necessity of reducing inflation levels, and
on the nature and magnitude of the shocks that hit these economies.
4.1 BUILDING CREDIBILITY AND REDUCING INFLATION RATE LEVELS
Institutions in emerging economies tend to be weaker than those in devel-
oped economies. Central banks are no exception. In this context, the adop-
tion of inflation targeting represents an effort to enhance the credibility of
the monetary authority as committed to price stability.
Nevertheless, building credibility takes time. During this transition
period, the central bank's actions not only have to be consistent with the
inflation-targeting framework, but they also have to take into account that
private agents do not fully trust that the central bank will act accordingly.
Private agents have concerns about the commitment of the central bank to
the target itself and to its reaction to shocks. In the first case, given the his-
tory of low credibility, private agents assign some positive probability
that the central bank will renege on its commitment to the targets. As
a result, the expected inflation and consequently the actual inflation
tend to be higher than with a perfectly credible monetary authority.
Similarly, when the economy is hit by an inflationary shock, private
agents do not trust completely that the central bank will react strongly. As
a consequence, the central bank incurs a cost of trust building because it
has to react to curb the inflationary pressures stemming from low credi-
bility and has to prove that it is committed to the new regime. During
some period, the volatility of the interest rate and output will be higher
and, because the central bank also takes into account output costs, the
inflation volatility also tends to be higher when compared to a situation
of full credibility.
13. The explanation of the calibration of the model is available on request to the authors.
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Figure 4 12-MONTH INFLATION RIGHT BEFORE IT ADOPTION
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Imperfect credibility concerning the fulfillment of the targets becomes
more important when we consider that the role of inflation targeting in
emerging economies goes beyond assuring that inflation is kept at
approximately its long-term level. It must first assure that inflation con-
verges to low levels. In fact, emerging market countries have had to face
much higher initial inflation rates than have developed countries. Table
1 showed the inflation around the moment of adoption of inflation tar-
geting (right before and after), and the initial targets. When inflation tar-
geting was adopted, the average inflation in the developed countries was
3.7%, whereas in the EMEs, it was 13.1%.14 The values are also shown in
Figure 4. Half of the developing economies had a two-digit inflation rate
when implementing inflation targeting. In the case of Peru, Chile, Israel,
and Mexico, the inflation rate was 39.5%, 27.3%, 18.0%, and 18.6%,
respectively.
The differences are even clearer when we consider the first targets that
were established (Figure 5). In developed economies, the maximum
upper bound for the target was 6%, with an average of 2.8% for the cen-
tral target. For developing economies, however, the highest upper bound
reached 20%, and the average was 10.3%.
Because inflation was higher than the long-term goal, the targets were
decreasing in time. Figure 6 shows the evolution of the central target aver-
age for both country groups. They are relatively stable for developed
economies, and they are decreasing for EMEs.
If inflation targeting is adopted in an economy with an inflation rate
significantly higher than the long-term goal, the central bank has to con-
14. The low inflation rate in Brazil that prevailed prior to the adoption of inflation targeting
was partly a result of an overvalued exchange rate.
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duct an active policy to bring inflation down that leads to output costs.
The reduction in inflation faces two obstacles, which result in costly dis-
inflation and higher volatility of inflation and output: (1) the already men-
tioned imperfect credibility and (2) the presence of some degree of
inflation persistence, resulting from some backward-looking behavior in
price setting. The presence of backward-looking behavior may be due to
factors such as indexed wage contracts, and adaptive expectations. In par-
ticular, in Brazil, the adjustment of regulated prices such as electricity and
telephone service follows a contractual rule that implies a high degree of
persistence.
Figure 5 FIRST CENTRAL TARGET ADOPTED
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Figure 6 INFLATION TARGET AVERAGES—CENTRAL POINTS
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Decreasing targets are a source of possible nonfulfillment of targets
because it is difficult to assess the current backward-looking behavior and
the speed of future convergence of inflation expectations. The higher
deviations from the targets in EMEs may then be related to the variabil-
ity of shocks as well as to the fact that inflation targeting was typically
adopted when inflation was significantly higher than the long-term
goal.
To have some indication of the speed of inflation convergence and of
the output costs involved, we have simulated the case of a reduction in
the inflation targets with imperfect credibility. To focus on this issue, we
have used the closed economy version of the model previously presented
(oc = 1, sc = 1). The result is a standard model. The aggregate supply curve
without the backward-looking term can be written as:
where X* = X(yc + yn). The central bank announces a reduction in the infla-
tion rate target from nTo to nTn as of the current quarter, but private agents
do not fully believe that this change is permanent. They assign a proba-
bility bt that, at the following quarter, the central bank reneges on its
announcement and returns to 7tTo. Therefore, the expected inflation rate
target is given by EtnJ+1 = bt KTO+ (1 - bt)7iT". We have considered the case of
an optimal monetary policy under discretion.15 The central bank is
allowed to reoptimize every period. We have assumed that if the central
bank maintains the new target, the probability of reneging on its
announcement declines over time. We have used a simple law of motion:
bf+i = Pb K where 0 < pb < I.16
Figure 7 shows the impulse responses of the output gap and inflation to
a reduction of 3 percentage points in the inflation target for the cases of
imperfect and perfect credibility. If we compare the first announced tar-
gets to the inflation in the previous twelve months (Table 1), we verify
that many countries had initial targets more than 3 percentage points
lower than the previous inflation. We have assumed that the initial prob-
ability of reneging is 0.8, and pfc = 0.8. Because we are considering quarterly
data, the latter implies that, at the end of the year, bt = 0.41. The inflation
rate refers to the four-quarter accumulated inflation above the new target.
We assume that inflation was stable at the old target before the announce-
ment. At the end of the first year, in the case of imperfect credibility, the
15. We have not shown the results under commitment because it is less reasonable to assume
that private agents believe the central bank is committed and, at the same time, does not
keep its commitment.
16. The derivation is available on request to the authors.
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Figure 7 IMPERFECT CREDIBILITY: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A 3
PERCENTAGE POINT INFLATION TARGET REDUCTION
Output Gap—Imperfect Credibility
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inflation rate is still 1.42 percentage points above the new target, and the
output gap presented a reduction of 0.49%, on average.17 Therefore, even
assuming a relatively rapid reduction in the degree of imperfect credibility,
the inflation rate converges only gradually to the new target. In the case of
perfect credibility, inflation expectations converge automatically to the
new target. As a result, inflation also converges immediately to the new
target, and this movement does not require any output gap reduction.
Similar reasoning is applied when the economy is hit by an inflationary
shock. The possibility that the central bank will not be tough for enough
time increases inflation expectations, thus requiring a higher output
reduction. The result is a higher volatility of inflation, output, and the inter-
est rate.
As stressed by Svensson (2002), the economy incurs higher output
variability at the beginning of the regime to gain credibility, but it ben-
efits later from an improved trade-off with lower output and inflation
variability, and the central bank can then be a more flexible inflation
targeter. In the case of Brazil, the construction of credibility has been a
process that combines reactions to inflationary pressures and increased
transparency to the public. The Banco Central do Brasil has reacted to
inflation expectations in a way that is consistent with the inflation-targeting
framework. Minella, Freitas, Goldfajn, and Muinhos (2003)18 have estimated
17. In this simulation, we are assuming that the relative output weight in the objective func-
tion is equal to 0.3. If we increase it to 1.0, the effect is significant on the output response
but low on the inflation path: the inflation rate is 1.45, and the output gap has a reduc-
tion of 0.15% on average.
18. That paper is an updated and shorter version of Minella, Freitas, Goldfajn, and Muinhos
(2002).
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a reaction function for the BCB for the first three-and-a-half years of infla-
tion targeting. It relates the interest rate to deviations of the 12-month
ahead expected inflation from the target, allowing also for some interest-rate
smoothing and reaction to the output gap.19 Table 4 shows the estimations
using the inflation forecast of the BCB and of private agents.20 The point
estimates of the coefficient on inflation expectations are greater than 1 and
significantly different from 0 in all specifications. In most of the specifica-
tions, the coefficient is statistically greater than I.21 Therefore, we can con-
clude that the BCB conducts monetary policy on a forward-looking basis
and responds to inflationary pressures.
We also simulate the case of reduction in the inflation targets in the
presence of a backward-looking component in the aggregate supply curve
equal to 0.4 (therefore, y/ = 0.6). We use the open economy version of the
model. The central bank reacts according to a simple expectational rule:
i, = 1.5 EtnM. The optimal coefficients found using two different weights
on the output gap in the objective function, wy = 0.3 and wy - 1.0, are 1.79
and 1.34, respectively.22 As in the case of imperfect credibility, inflation
decreases slowly to the new target, and the optimal output gap is nega-
tive. With a 3 percentage point reduction in the inflation target, inflation
is 0.78 percentage point above the target at the fourth quarter, and the out-
put gap reduction is 0.55% on average in the first year. In the case of a
purely forward-looking aggregate supply curve, inflation converges auto-
matically to the new target.
Because the inflation-targeting regime is supposed to affect inflation
expectations, we can consider the possibility that the backward-looking
component in the price adjustment becomes less important as credibility
increases. The share of backward-looking firms could become smaller
and/or firms could give less consideration to past inflation when adjust-
ing prices. Either situation would reduce the degree of persistence in
19. They have estimated the equation i, = ax iM + (1 - a.i)(oi0 + a2 (Efn t+j - 7tt+;) + oc3 y,^), where
it is the Selic rate decided by the monetary policy committee (Copom), Et 7t,+; equals
inflation expectations, and K*+j is the inflation target, where j = 12, and y, is the output
gaP-
20. Private agents' expectations are obtained from a survey that the Investors Relation
Group (Gerin) of the BCB conducts among banks and non-financial companies.
(Available at www.bcb.gov.br. Market Readout and Market Expectations Time Series of
Investor Relations Section).
21. The point estimates vary, however, across specifications. Using private agents' expecta-
tions (sample 2000:1-2002:12), the point estimates are around 2.1 to 2.3, whereas with
BCB expectations (sample 1999:6-2002:12), they are 3.5 and 5.7. The p-values for the test
that the coefficient is equal to 1 are 0.150, 0.101, 0.012, and 0.040 in specifications I, II, III,
and IV, respectively.
22. Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) have found a value between 0.32 and 0.41 for inflation-
targeting countries. Batini, Harrison, and Millard (2003) have used 1.0 (including also a
term for the interest rate in the objective function).
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Table 4 ESTIMATION OF REACTION FUNCTION OF THE BANCO
CENTRAL DO BRASIL: DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TARGET FOR THE
NOMINAL SELIC INTEREST RATE (MONTHLY DATA)1
Regressors
Constant
Interest rate (t-1)
Inflation expectations
(deviations from
the target)
Output gap(t-l)
R2
Adjusted R2
LM test for autocorrelation
of residuals (p-values)
H a g
4 lags
Using central bank inflation
expectations
(1999:7-2002:12)
I
1.65
(1.08)
0.90***
(0.06)
5.70*
(3.20)
0.9129
0.9084
0.7853
0.6831
II
3.06*
(1.59)
0.82***
(0.09)
3.54**
(1.51)
-0.36*
(0.21)
0.9160
0.9094
0.7210
0.5298
Using market inflation
expectations
(2000:1-2002:12)
III
4.58***
(1.52)
0.71***
(0.09)
2.32***
(0.53)
0.9205
0.9157
0.6586
0.5362
IV
5.38**
(2.07)
0.67***
(0.12)
2.09***
(0.53)
-0.10
(0.15)
0.9214
0.9140
0.6411
0.3991
1. Standard error in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Source: Minella, Freitas, Goldfajn, and Muinhos (2003).
inflation. Minella, Freitas, Goldfajn, and Muinhos (2003) have estimated a
simple aggregate supply curve for the low inflation period in Brazil to
assess if the inflation-targeting regime was accompanied by some struc-
tural change.23 They regress inflation rate on its own lags, the unemploy-
ment rate (lagged one period), and the exchange-rate change in 12 months
(lagged one period).
Table 5 records the results when including only one lag for inflation
and when including two. The regression also includes dummy vari-
ables that multiply the constant and lagged inflation for the inflation-
targeting period,24 and a dummy that assumes the value of 1 for the last
three months of 2002. Without adding this last dummy, the residuals in
both specifications present serial correlation. Actually, the end of 2002
is a peculiar period, one that does not fit a simple Phillips curve. The
authors find that the backward-looking term has decreased. The point
estimate of the autoregressive coefficient decreases from 0.56 to 0.10 in
23. The procedure is similar to the one in Kuttner and Posen (1999).
24. Dummies for the inflation-targeting period that multiply unemployment and the exchange
rate do not enter significantly; therefore, they were excluded from the estimation.
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Table 5 ESTIMATION OF AGGREGATE SUPPLY CURVE: DEPENDENT
VARIABLE: MONTHLY INFLATION RATE (1995:08-2002:12)1
Regressors
Constant
Dummy constant1
Inflation rate (t-1)
Inflation rate (t-2)
Dummy inflation rate (t-l) f
Dummy inflation rate (t-2)+
Unemployment (t-1)
Exchange rate change (t-1) (12-month average)
Dummy 2002Q4*
R2
Adjusted R2
LM test for autocorrelation of residuals (p-values)
H a g
4 lags
/
0.65*
(0.36)
0.34***
(0.12)
0.56***
(0.11)
-0.46***
(0.17)
-0.08
(0.05)
0.08*
(0.04)
1.42***
(0.26)
0.5593
0.5271
0.6646
0.2218
II
0.70*
(0.36)
0.51***
(0.14)
0.62***
(0.15)
-0.09
(0.14)
-0.43*
(0.19)
-0.35*
(0.20)
-0.09*
(0.05)
0.09**
(0.04)
1.47***
(0.25)
0.6022
0.5624
0.7022
0.3599
1. Standard error in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively. Since exchange rate change refers to the 12-month change, the sample starts in
1995:08 to avoid the inclusion of data of the period before the stabilization.
'Dummy has value 1 in the inflation-targeting period (1999:06-2002:12), and 0 otherwise. It multiplies the
associated variable.
(Dummy has value 1 in 2002:10-2002:12, and 0 otherwise.
Source: Minella, Freitas, Goldfajn, and Muinhos (2003).
the inflation-targeting period when compared to the previous period of
low inflation (specification I).25
4.2 DOMINANCE ISSUES: FISCAL, FINANCIAL, AND EXTERNAL
We deal here with three elements that seem to be potential features of EMEs:
weak fiscal regimes, the risks associated with poorly regulated financial sys-
tems, and large external shocks. Each of these problems can lead to a form
of dominance: fiscal, financial, or external. In the case of fiscal and financial
dominance, the problems that arise on the monetary policy front are quite
25. This result is in line with the findings in Kuttner and Posen (2001). Using a broad dataset
of 191 monetary frameworks from 41 countries, they found that inflation targeting
reduces inflation persistence.
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similar: the fear that one or both regimes will break down increases the
probability that the government will inflate in the future, and therefore
increases expected inflation. This in turn increases the challenge of estab-
lishing a solid monetary anchor. The external dominance refers to the vul-
nerability to external shocks, which results in higher macroeconomic
volatility.
4.2.1 Fiscal Dominance The success of inflation targeting or any other
monetary regime requires the absence of fiscal dominance. Therefore,
implementation of inflation targeting must be accompanied by a strong fis-
cal regime. But even with that, in the case of past weaknesses, it takes time
for government to gain the full confidence of private agents. This fear of
fiscal dominance affects inflation expectations, requiring a tighter mone-
tary policy, which in turn negatively affects the fiscal balance.
The challenge, therefore, is to build fiscal and monetary regimes that
reinforce one another. The evidence we have thus far on this issue is
promising, but it may be too early to celebrate. Schaechter, Stone, and
Zelmer (2000) show that the fiscal imbalance at the time inflation target-
ing was adopted was lower in developing countries.
4.2.2 Financial Dominance A problem for the conduct of monetary policy
can arise when there is fear that a tightening may lead to a financial crisis.
This may come as a consequence of a weak and/or overleveraged finan-
cial system and may bring about the expectation that monetary policy will
not be conducted with the goal of defending the nominal anchor of the
economy. This problem can be characterized as a form of dominance,
which we can name financial dominance. For example, Goldfajn and
Gupta (2003) have found that, in the aftermath of currency crises, an econ-
omy that faces a banking crisis (1) has a lower probability of choosing a
tight policy, and (2) when tight monetary policy is adopted, the probabil-
ity of a successful recovery is lower.26
Banking sector weaknesses, and financial vulnerabilities in general,
played a key role in the Asian crisis of 1997. This type of fragility may also
be an issue when the financial system exhibits a significant presence of
government-owned banks, either because these banks may themselves be
weak or because the government may use its banks unwisely. Just as in
the case of fiscal dominance, it is necessary to work toward a strong fiscal
regime; in the case of financial dominance, care must be taken to make
sure the regulation and supervision of the financial system is sound and
permanent.
26. They have used a dataset of currency crises in 80 countries for the period 1980-1998.
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Another issue is the predominance of short-term financial contracts and
lower financial depth in EMEs, which tend to weaken the monetary policy
transmission mechanisms.27 According to Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer
(2000), the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP was on average 51.0% in EMEs
and 72.0% in developed countries in 1997. The ratio of private credit to
GDP was 63.9% and 81.0%, respectively. As Taylor (2000) stresses, without
longer-term markets, short-term interest rates will have to move more
quickly. Therefore, we tend to observe higher interest-rate volatility.
4.2.3 External Dominance: Sudden Stops Another possible explanation for
the volatility shown in Section 2 is the existence of larger shocks in EMEs.
External shocks tend to play a more important role in EMEs than they do
in developed countries. EMEs are subject to sudden stops in capital
inflows. These shocks significantly affect the exchange rate, and conse-
quently the inflation rate, leading to higher interest rates to curb the infla-
tionary pressures. As a result, these economies tend to present a higher
volatility of interest rates and exchange rates.
Of course, sudden stops themselves may reflect weaker fundamentals,
which translate into lower credit ratings, among other problems. On the
other hand, the presence of large and frequent external shocks generates
greater instability in the economy and may jeopardize the fulfillment of
the targets, which in turn may negatively affect the credibility of the
regime. This may be seen as a form of external dominance. It must be
addressed through the strengthening of the fundamentals of the economy,
such as, in the case of inflation targeting, a fairly clean exchange-rate float
(by that, we mean the absence of an exchange-rate target) and in general
a sufficient degree of openness and flexibility.
The data presented in Table 2 confirmed the higher volatility of the
interest rate in EMEs. For the exchange rate, the data is less clear but
points to a higher volatility. The coefficient of variation (the ratio of the
standard deviation to the average) is 0.15 in EMEs and 0.11 in developed
economies. There are some differences, however, within the group of
developing economies. Brazil, Chile, Hungary, Peru, and South Africa
presented significantly greater exchange-rate volatility. The average of the
coefficient of variation of the five countries is 0.22.
To try to measure the importance of external shocks, we have run vec-
tor autoregression (VAR) estimations for selected countries. We have used
monthly and quarterly data of four variables: industrial production (or
GDP), the consumer price index, the interest rate, and the exchange rate.
27. Actually, there are two opposite effects in the case of short-term contracts: the wealth
effect of change in the interest rates is lower, but changes in the interest rates affect the
cost of outstanding debt more quickly.
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We have used a Cholesky decomposition with the order mentioned. We
have considered two specifications: (1) all variables in log level, and (2)
the price and exchange rate in first log-difference. We have estimated for
three periods: a large period (which varies across countries but in general
starts in the 1980s), the period before the adoption of inflation targeting,
and the inflation-targeting period. (All of them end in mid-2002.) Table 6
records the values for the variance error decomposition of the interest rate
and price level (or inflation rate), considering a 12-month or 4-quarter
horizon, for the inflation-targeting period. In particular, we show the per-
centage of the forecast error of the interest rate and prices (or inflation)
that is explained by shocks to the exchange rate. In Brazil and South
Africa, shocks to the exchange rate explain a significant part of the fore-
cast error of interest rate and prices. In Brazil, they explain 49% of the
interest rate forecast errors and 18% of the price forecast error (this figure
is not statistically significant though). South Korea has similar results
using monthly data, mainly for the interest rate. On the other hand, for
the developed economies and for Mexico, the estimations indicate that the
exchange rate does not play an important role.
Exchange-rate fluctuations do not always reflect the pressure of the
external shocks because of policy responses, which include interest-rate
changes and direct intervention in the exchange-rate market. Some
emerging markets opt not to allow the exchange rate to reflect the extent
of the external shocks. Some of the arguments are related to fear of float-
ing (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).28 In addition to inflationary pressures,
significant exchange-rate fluctuations have other implications for the
economy, such as uncertainty concerning prices and the value of dollar-
denominated liabilities and assets. Huge depreciations of the domestic
currency may affect the financial solvency of firms and financial institu-
tions. In this case, the central bank may have additional goals in its
objective function. According to Amato and Gerlach (2002), several rea-
sons may make it appropriate for EMEs to give importance to the
exchange rate beyond that related to its inflationary effects: (1) with less
developed foreign exchange markets, large shocks or capital flows cause
significant volatility in the exchange rate if they are neglected by poli-
cies; (2) in economies with a poor history of monetary stability, the
exchange rate tends to be a focal point for inflationary expectations;
(3) exchange-rate fluctuations may have a large impact on the relative
profitability of firms across sectors; and (4) foreign currency borrowing
may be significant.
28. Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) have developed a system of reclassifying historical exchange-
rate regimes. They have found that regimes that were officially classified as floating in
reality use a form of de facto peg.
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Therefore, it is worth examining the spread over treasuries of the for-
eign currency denominated debt of the country as another indicator of
external shocks. Table 7 shows the average and volatility of the spread of
the emerging market bond index plus (EMBI+) over the U.S. Treasury for
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Poland, and South Korea. Except for
Poland, the standard deviation is always higher than 118 basis points. In
the case of Brazil, it reaches 377 basis points in the inflation-targeting
period.
Table 6 VARIANCE ERROR DECOMPOSITION AFTER ADOPTION OF
INFLATION TARGETING (12-MONTH OR 4-QUARTER HORIZON)
(PERCENTAGE); VAR WITH FOUR VARIABLES: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
(GDP), CPI, INTEREST RATE, AND EXCHANGE RATE
Monthly Data+
Estimation in ilevels for price
and exchange rate
Shocks to the
exchange rate
explaining the
forecast error
for the interest
rate
Developed Economies
Canada
Sweden
United Kingdom
1
2
0
Emerging Market Economies
Brazil
Mexico
South Africa
South Korea
Quarterly Data*
49*
2
36*
26*
Developed Economies
Australia
Canada
New Zealand
Sweden
United Kingdom
12
0
11
4
0
Emerging Market Economies
Brazil
Mexico
South Korea
57*
1
3
Shocks to
the exchange
rate explaining
the forecast
error for
inflation
0
8
17
18
1
25*
7
3
1
3
1
0
35
0
3
Estimation in first difference
for price and exchange rate
Shocks to the
exchange rate
explaining the
forecast error
for the interest
rate
1
4
10
8
0
36*
32
1
2
4
4
1
10
1
5
Shocks to the
exchange rate
explaining the
forecast error
for inflation
1
6
5
29*
0
25
9
11
2
3
10
1
20
12
8
*Indicates that the value is significant at the 5% level.
+New Zealand and Australia do not have cpi and industrial production on a monthly basis.
*The sample for South Africa is too short.
Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Economies • 387
As a result of these external pressures, we tend to observe a higher
volatility of output, interest rates, and the exchange rate, and the possi-
bility of nonfulfillment of targets tends to be higher. In the case of Brazil,
the significant depreciation of the domestic currency was the main factor
behind the nonfulfillment of the inflation targets in 2001 and 2002. The
nominal exchange rate in Brazil accumulated an increase of 84.7% during
2001 and 2002 (a depreciation of the domestic currency of 45.9%), repre-
senting a real depreciation of 44.6%.
We use the model to simulate the effects of a shock to the real
exchange rate of 45%, but instead of using the UIP condition, we use an
autoregressive process for the real exchange rate (with an autoregressive
coefficient equal to 0.5). As before, the central bank reacts according to a
simple expectational rule: it = 1.5Ef nt+1, and the coefficient on lagged
inflation is 0.4.
Figure 8 shows the impulse responses. At the end of the fourth quarter,
the four-quarter accumulated inflation reaches 5.16%, and the output gap
reduction is on average 6.80% in the first year. Therefore, even with a sig-
nificant output gap reduction, any existing inflation target would be
breached. If we consider the inflation target for Brazil in 2002 of 4%, then
with this simulation, the inflation rate would reach 9.7%, distant even
from the upper bound of 6.5%.
The existence of this possibility of breaching the targets due to large
shocks leads us to analyze important issues in the design of inflation tar-
geting in emerging markets. The next section explores how to deal with
higher volatility in an inflation-targeting regime.
Table 7 EMBI+ (BASED ON MONTHLY AVERAGE)
Country
Brazil
Colombia
Mexico
Peru
Poland
South Korea
1997:01-2002
Average
879.35
651.18
443.40
601.75
233.03
236.37
Standard
deviation
389.07
118.48
150.03
120.64
38.17
145.39
•12*
Coefficient
of variation
(s.d./
average)
0.44
0.18
0.34
0.20
0.16
0.62
After IT adoption until 2002:12f
Average
987.14
648.04
408.37
601.75
232.65
236.37
Standard
Deviation
377.82
123.83
130.19
120.64
35.88
145.39
Coefficient
of variation
(s.d./
average)
0.38
0.19
0.32
0.20
0.15
0.62
^Colombia: 1999:05-2002:12. Peru: 1998:01-2002:12. Poland: 1998:01-2002:12. South Korea: 1998:
05-2002:12. For Brazil and Mexico, the data for 1997 refers to EMBI.
+South Korea: 1998:05-2002:12.
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5. How to Deal with Higher Volatility?
The central element of the inflation-targeting regime is the public
announcement of a numerical target for inflation. As Mishkin (2002)
stresses, however, inflation targeting comprises much more than that. It
also involves (1) an institutional commitment to price stability as the pri-
mary goal of monetary policy, to which other goals are subordinated; (2)
the use of many variables for the instrument policy decision; (3) increased
transparency of monetary policy strategy; and (4) an increased account-
ability of the central bank.
The issues presented in the previous section imply important chal-
lenges for monetary policy. The key aspect is how to build credibility in
the conduct of monetary policy and in the inflation-targeting regime itself,
and at the same time remain flexible enough to avoid unnecessary output
costs that could lead to a perception that the regime is too costly.
Communication and transparency become crucial.
One of the most appealing features of inflation targeting is the flexibil-
ity it allows monetary policy when the economy is confronted with
shocks. For instance, in dealing with a supply shock, the professional con-
sensus among academic economists and central bankers is that a central
bank should accommodate the direct price-level impact of the shock
while calibrating monetary policy to avoid further rounds of price
increases. In practice, however, this approach may come at a cost. The cen-
tral bank's commitment to low inflation may be questioned if the nature
of the shock and the appropriateness of the policy response are not clear
Figure 8 IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A 45 PERCENTAGE POINT REAL
EXCHANGE RATE SHOCK
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to most observers. The solution to this conundrum is to provide enough
information to the public to clarify that the policy response is the right
answer to a well-understood problem.
In general, the optimal response depends on the nature of the shock, on
several economic parameters and elasticities, and on the preferences of
society relative to the inflation versus output gap volatility trade-off. At a
basic level, it is crucial therefore that the central bank make an effort to
identify the size and nature of the shocks, focusing in particular on
whether one is dealing with supply or demand shocks, temporary or per-
manent shocks, and the size and inflationary impact of the shocks. Once
the shocks are identified, the central bank can choose a monetary policy
response that will deliver the chosen feasible pair of inflation and output
gap paths.
Inflation-targeting central banks have developed several tools to deal
with these issues. They involve the inflation-targeting design, trans-
parency, adjusted targets, and a change in the IMF conditionality.
5.1 TARGET BANDS, HORIZONS, AND PERSISTENCE OF SHOCKS
The possibility that large shocks may cause target breaches leads to an
important feature in the design of the inflation-targeting regime: the size
of the band around the central point of the target. Tighter bands tend to
signal a preference for lower inflation volatility relative to lower output
volatility. The band is typically seen as a barrier not to be broken.
In a world of perfect information, however, where all shocks are pre-
cisely identified, there is no role for bands around the inflation target.
Deviations from the point target would occur as an optimal response to
shocks, given the parameters of the economy and the inflation aversion of
society. An optimal response to a very large shock may demand large
deviations from the central point of the target, sometimes beyond the
upper bound of the target. The same holds for the horizon over which
inflation is allowed to deviate from the target when the economy is hit by
shocks. This horizon should also be determined according to the type,
size, and persistence of the shock as well as the parameters mentioned
above.
So why do countries opt to include target bands? While some countries
may treat the band limit as a strict barrier not to be broken, in our view the
bands should be treated mainly as a communications device. The bands
should be considered mainly as checkpoints, with the central bank
explaining clearly the reasons for the nonfulfillment of the targets. This
discussion is not easily translated, however, into operational guidelines
that can be implemented by the central bank. As a result, it is necessary
that the assumptions underlying the decisionmaking process of the central
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bank be communicated clearly. This approach means being explicit about
a fairly precise path of inflation on the way back to the targeted level to
avoid losing the confidence of economic agents. Transparency therefore
plays the key role of imposing enough discipline on the central bank to
avoid the temptations depicted in the time-consistency literature.29
In practice, the size of the bands varies across countries: 1 percentage
point in Australia and Israel; 3 percentage points in South Africa; 3.5 in
Iceland; and 4 in Brazil for 2002, and 5 for 2003 and 2004. What should be
the size of the bands? One possibility would be to keep them large
enough to allow the inflation rate within the bands in most of the cir-
cumstances if monetary policy is conducted efficiently. Given some vari-
ability of shocks in the economy, inflation should be inside the bands in
most, say, 90%, of the cases. Using the model, and assuming some vari-
ance for the shocks, we obtain the standard deviation of inflation (given
some optimal rule). If we assume that the random shocks are normally
distributed, we would find a band size corresponding to 1.65 standard
deviations of inflation.
The recurrent presence of larger shocks may also recommend higher
central targets. As shown in Figure 6, the difference between the targets of
EMEs and developed countries has decreased, but it is still positive. In
2002, the central point target for EMEs was 3.7%, whereas for developed
countries it was 2.2%. The higher target reflects not only higher past infla-
tion but also the greater vulnerability to external shocks. One possible rea-
son is the asymmetric effects of supply shocks. Given greater downward
price rigidity, deflationary shocks tend to have a lower effect in inflation
than do inflationary shocks. As a consequence, with higher shocks, this
bias tends to be higher.
The issue of the magnitude of the response to shocks leads us also to the
discussion of the horizon to be used in the inflation-targeting framework.
As emphasized by Svensson (2002), in practice, flexible inflation targeting
(where some weight is given to output stabilization) means aiming to
achieve the inflation target at a somewhat longer horizon. Because EMEs
are more subject to larger shocks, their target horizon should naturally be
longer. A danger here, of course, is that if the central bank is still building
credibility, longer horizons could be interpreted as lenience, thus affecting
the central bank's reputation.
In practice, there is no magic number for the horizon that a central bank
should use to guide its reaction to supply shocks. It should be long
29. It seems these days that the important lesson of the time-consistency literature has reached
most central banks. In fact, one finds a substantial number of central bankers around the
world who seem to act like the inflation-averse central bankers in Rogoff (1985).
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enough to allow the workings of the monetary policy transmission mech-
anisms and some degree of smoothing of the effects of the shock. On the
other hand, it should be short enough to neutralize part of its inflationary
effect and allow convergence of inflation expectations to the target. At any
rate, it is crucial that the central bank's response be clearly explained to
avoid reputational risk. Section 5.3 presents the procedure adopted by the
BCB in dealing with a series of large shocks during the years 2001 and
2002.
5.2 MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEES, MEETING MINUTES, AND AN
INFLATION REPORT
To stress the importance of the existence of a monetary policy committee
(MPC) may sound unnecessary to most observers in more advanced
economies, but it is not a trivial matter in the EMEs. Until one such com-
mittee was created in Brazil, for example, monetary policy decisions were
made on an ad-hoc basis, typically at the end of a board meeting, at the
end of the day, when everyone was already quite exhausted, and often
without the benefit of proper preparation and analysis. An MPC that
meets regularly, on a monthly basis, has created a proper environment for
what, after all, is the key role of a central bank: to run monetary policy.
The MPC meetings have become a ritual that provides those responsible
for setting policy with a well-informed decisionmaking environment. It
moves board members away from their otherwise hectic day-to-day
schedules of meetings and phone calls and allows them to focus on the
task at hand.
A crucial aspect of inflation targeting is the ability to enhance the cred-
ibility of the policymaking process and, as a result, to achieve the desired
goals with minimum costs. The timely publication of the detailed minutes
of MPC meetings is a key ingredient for an effective communications
strategy. In emerging economies, where credibility is typically lower than
one would like, the benefits of publishing this information can be sub-
stantial.
In addition to monthly meeting minutes, most inflation-targeting cen-
tral banks also publish a quarterly inflation report where their views on
economic prospects and, in particular, on inflation trends are presented in
detail.30 Again, for EMEs, these reports play a key role, serving the pur-
pose of minimizing uncertainty about the central bank's analysis and
goals. Inflation reports are appropriate vehicles for the central bank to
present its views on complex issues such as the degree of exchange-rate
30. For an assessment of inflation reports by inflation-targeting central banks, see Fracasso,
Genberg, and Wyplosz (2003).
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pass-through, the degree of inflationary persistence, the workings of the
transmission mechanism, and so on.
5.3 SHOCKS AND ADJUSTED TARGETS
The recent experience of Brazil with inflation targeting during turbulent
times serves to illustrate the practical application of the general guidelines
and principles discussed above. This section summarizes the methodol-
ogy currently used in Brazil. It calculates the inflationary impact of cur-
rent supply shocks as well as the secondary impact of past shocks (due to
inertia in the inflation process). The idea is simply to accommodate the
direct impact of current shocks and to choose a horizon to weed out the
secondary impact of past shocks.
When facing shocks, the BCB initially considers the nature and persist-
ence of the shock. Then it builds different inflation and output trajectories
associated with different interest-rate paths. Based on its aversion to infla-
tion variability, it chooses the optimal path for output and inflation. Banco
Central do Brasil (2003) has published this path and also the outcome of
different paths. This is in line with Svensson's (2002) recommendations.31
If shocks are large and/or persistent, however, their inflationary effects
may last one year or more. The optimal inflation path may imply a
12-month ahead inflation superior to the previous annual target.
Therefore, in this situation, because the BCB would not be targeting the
previous inflation target, it uses an adjusted target. More specifically, the
target is adjusted to take into account primary effects of change in relative
prices and of past inertia that will be accommodated. The new target is
publicly announced. Although there is a credibility loss stemming
from the target change itself, the gains in terms of transparency and com-
munication are more significant. Private agents know the target pursued
by the BCB. Keeping the old target would affect the credibility of the
BCB because it could be considered unattainable. In the concept of the
adjusted target, the primary effect of the shock to regulated-price inflation,
and the inflation inertia inherited from the previous year to be accommo-
dated in the current year, are added to the target previously set by the gov-
ernment. Facing cost shocks, such as the increase of regulated prices above
the inflation of the other prices of the economy, monetary policy should be
calibrated to accommodate the direct impact of shocks on the price level
but to fight their secondary effects. Furthermore, because the BCB
also takes into account output costs, the inertial impacts of the previous
year's inflation should not necessarily be fought completely.
31. Svensson's (2002) recommendations also involve publishing the corresponding instru-
ment-rate plan.
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Indeed, significant shocks, such as increases in the price of regulated
utilities and the exchange rate, have been one of the main challenges faced
by the BCB. Since the implementation of the Real Plan in July 1994, regu-
lated-price inflation has been well above the market-price inflation for
various reasons. Since the start of the inflation-targeting period, the ratio
of regulated prices to market prices rose 31.4% (1999:7-2003:2). As long as
there is some downward rigidity in prices, changes in relative prices are
usually translated into higher inflation. If these increases are treated as a
supply shock, monetary policy should be oriented toward eliminating
only their secondary impact on inflation while preserving the initial
realignment of relative prices. Therefore, the efforts of the BCB to quantify
the first-order inflationary impact of the regulated-price inflation have
become particularly important because they help to implement monetary
policy in a flexible manner, without losing sight of the larger objective of
achieving the inflation targets.
The first-order inflationary impact of the shock to regulated items is
defined as the variation in regulated prices exceeding the target for the
inflation rate, weighted by the share of regulated prices in the IPCA (con-
sumer price index) and excluding the effects of the inflation inertia from
the previous year and of variations in the exchange rate:
ShA = (nadm -7T*)* (oadm - (IA + CaA) (9)
where ShA = first-order inflationary impact of regulated prices
nadm = inflation of regulated prices
TI* = target for the inflation
ayadm = weight of regulated prices in the IPCA
IA = effect of inertia in the previous year on the evolution of reg-
ulated prices
CaA = effect of the exchange-rate variation on the evolution of reg-
ulated prices
The effect of inflation inertia is excluded because inflation propagation
mechanisms should be neutralized by the monetary policy over a period
deemed to be appropriate (again, based on inflation aversion and other
parameters). The exchange-rate variation is excluded because it is affected
by monetary policy and could reflect demand shocks. If the effect of
exchange-rate changes were automatically included, monetary policy
would be validating any inflationary pressure coming from the exchange
rate (including demand pressures). Therefore, in defining the shock to reg-
ulated prices, only the component of relative price change that is predeter-
mined or backward-looking, and therefore cannot be affected by monetary
policy in the short run, is preserved as a first-order supply shock.
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Table 8 ADJUSTED TARGETS FOR 2003 AND 2004
4.0
1.7
2.8
4.2
1.4
2.8
8.5
3.75
1.1
0.6
1.0
0.4
0.6
5.5
Itemization 2003 2004
(a) Target for inflation set by the government
(b) Regulated-price shocks1
(c) Inertia not to be fought in the current year2
Inherited inertia from the previous year (total)
of regulated prices
of market prices
(d) Adjusted targets = (a) + (b) + (c)
1. For the calculation of the shock, the effect of inertia and the exchange rate on regulated-price inflation
is deducted.
2. The inertia not to be fought in the current year corresponds to % of the inertia inherited from the pre-
vious year. Source: Banco Central do Brasil (2003).
Table 8 shows how this methodology was applied to Brazil for inflation
in 2003 and 2004.32 The target established by the government for 2003 is
4%. However, the regulated-price shocks are estimated at 1.7%. This value
represents the expected contribution for the overall inflation of a change
in relative prices that is not related to the inflation inertia from the previ-
ous year and to the exchange-rate change. Since these first-round effects
should not be neutralized, they are added to the target of the BCB, lead-
ing to an adjusted target of 5.7%.
Furthermore, the BCB also takes into account the nature and persist-
ence of the shocks and the output costs involved in the disinflationary
process (the output weight in the objective function is greater than zero).
In this case, the BCB decided to fight against one-third of the inertia inher-
ited from the previous year. This inertia is estimated at 4.2%. Therefore,
we have to add 2.8% to the target, leading to an adjusted target of 8.5%,
which was publicly announced.
The decision to pursue an inflation trajectory based on these adjusted
targets considers that monetary policy will be able to lead inflation to con-
verge to the target tolerance interval in two years. We should stress, how-
ever, that two years is not a magic number. It depends on the size and type
of the shock. Figure 9 draws the actual and expected path for inflation
(Banco Central do Brasil, 2003). The trajectory is compatible with the (end-
of-year) adjusted targets.
Other trajectories with steeper decreases of inflation imply an excessive
loss of output. Simulations indicate that a trajectory of inflation that
reaches 6.5% in 2003, the ceiling of the target tolerance interval, would
32. See Banco Central do Brasil (2003). For a more detailed explanation of the methodology,
see Freitas, Minella, and Riella (2002).
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imply a 1.6% drop in GDP. A trajectory that reaches the center of the tar-
get, 4%, in 2003, would imply an even larger decline in GDP (-7.3%).
One could argue that the decision to neutralize the shock in a longer time
horizon, based on an evaluation of the size and persistence of the shock,
may lead to time-consistency issues: too much accommodation in the short
run could lead to a loss of credibility in the long run. In fact, it is essential
that the whole procedure be explained publicly in detail so that the agents
can judge effectively whether the size and persistence of the shock justify
the decision taken by the central bank. It is the transparency, therefore, that
imposes enough discipline to avoid time-consistency issues.
In the inflation-targeting design, a core inflation measure or the estab-
lishment of escape clauses has also been used or suggested as a way of deal-
ing with shocks and volatilities. The main argument contrary to the use of
core inflation is that it is less representative of the loss of the purchasing
power of money at a given point in time. Agents are concerned about the
whole basket of consumption. In the case of Brazil, exclusion of the regu-
lated price items would leave out more than 30% of the representative con-
sumption basket. In this sense, private agents may question a monetary
policy that is not concerned about the overall consumer price index.
In general, there are two advantages to the use of the adjusted target
procedure. First, the core inflation measure is not necessarily isolated
from the effect of shocks. For example, the large depreciation shock of the
Brazilian economy in 2002 led to a core inflation—calculated by the sym-
metric trimmed mean method—of 8.8%, way above the inflation target.
Second, the construction of the adjusted target is directly based on the
idea that monetary policy should neutralize second-order effects of supply
shocks and accommodate the first-round effects, and on the fact that some
Figure 9 TWELVE-MONTH INFLATION
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weight to output volatility should be assigned in the objective function.
Therefore, the principles under which the monetary policy is conducted
become more transparent.
In the case of escape clauses, the circumstances under which the central
bank can justify the nonfulfillment of the targets are set in advance. It has
more similarities with the adjusted target procedure than with the use of
a core inflation measure because it does not exclude items from the infla-
tion target but defines circumstances in which the breach of targets can be
justified. The main advantages of the adjusted target procedure are the
following: (1) it is a forward-looking procedure, (2) it defines clearly
the new target to be pursued by the central bank, and (3) it explains how
the new target is measured.
5.4 IMF PROGRAMS AND CONDITIONALITY
This section focuses on the IMF conditionality in the case of a country
under an inflation-targeting regime.33 We stress two issues: (1) the dimin-
ished role of net domestic assets (NDA) conditionality, and (2) how to
insert inflation performance as a criterion for the assessment of a mone-
tary policy stance.
5.4.1 NDA Conditionality Versus Inflation Targeting Brazil was the first
country under an inflation-targeting system to have an agreement with
the IMF. From a theoretical point of view, the NDA conditionality, which
is usually the one found in the agreements to evaluate the stance of mon-
etary policy, is not adequate for an inflation-targeting regime because it
harms transparency and can force the central bank to take unnecessary
monetary policy actions.
Money demand is unstable, and the monetary aggregates seem to be
poor predictors of inflation. Therefore, autonomous increases in the level of
money demand would require, in the case of NDA ceilings or monetary
base targeting, an increase in the interest rate without any inflation-target-
ing policy purpose. We would then observe higher volatility in the interest
rate than needed. Furthermore, the imposition of an NDA ceiling can harm
transparency in the sense that it would add to the inflation target another
monetary policy goal. One of the main advantages of an inflation-targeting
regime is the definition of a clear target for monetary policy. The existence
of another target affects the credibility of the main goal of monetary policy.
5.4.2 Inflation Performance As a Criterion for the Assessment of a Monetary
Policy Stance In place of NDA targets, inflation performance emerges as a
33. See also Blejer, Leone, Rabanal, and Schwartz (2002), and Bogdanski, Freitas, Goldfajn,
and Tombini (2001).
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natural criterion for the assessment of a monetary policy stance. Of course,
because inflation targets focus on inflation forecasts, assessing inflation
outcomes has to account for the shocks that hit the economy. At least two
issues have to be addressed in the case of an IMF program: the frequency
of the assessments (reviews), and the criteria on which to base the targets.
IMF programs have quarterly reviews, whereas in an inflation-targeting
framework, inflation performance is assessed at longer horizons. The use of
annualized quarterly inflation figures as targets is not recommended because
they are more volatile and subject to the strong influence of temporary shocks.
Brazil has used a 12-month inflation as the monetary quarterly target in the
technical memorandum of understanding with the IMF. It also includes inner
and outer bands of 1.0 percentage point and 2.5 percentage points, respec-
tively, both above and below the central targets. Figure 10 shows the targets
agreed to by the IMF and the BCB in the second review of Brazil's performance
in March 2003. The target for the 12-month inflation of the quarter following
the agreement considers the inflation verified in the three previous quarters
plus an estimate for the next quarter inflation. If an important shock hits the
economy in the next quarter, however, inflation may breach the target.
The path of the targets with the IMF should be consistent with the annual
targets of the inflation-targeting regime. This approach is in line with the
forward-looking or pre-emptive nature of the inflation-targeting system. At
the same time, it eliminates the problem of the effect of quarterly figures
because the time horizon for the inflation target could be defined as four
quarters. Eventual (predicted) pickups of inflation during the year should
not alter the monetary policy committee decisions, provided inflation is
expected to converge to the target and provided shocks in one year keep
affecting inflation in the following year, but only through the direct chan-
nel, that is, via the autoregressive component of inflation.
Figure 10 INFLATION TARGETS (CENTRAL POINT AND UPPER AND
LOWER BOUNDS) AGREED WITH THE IMF
— •
2002:4 2003:1 2003:2 2003:3
Year: Quarter
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The main difficulty arises with the necessity of agreement between the
IMF and the central bank concerning the model used and the associated
risks, and reaching this agreement may also be time consuming.
Therefore, it also involves the construction of credibility by the forecast-
making process of the central bank.
In the agreements between Brazil and the IMF, the inflation forecasts
made by the BCB have been used as an important criterion for the def-
inition of the targets. However, the revisions are still made on a quar-
terly basis based on the actual inflation. The reasons for the
nonfulfillment of targets have been explained thoroughly to the public
and to the IMF.
6. Conclusion
Inflation targeting in EMEs has been relatively successful but has
proven to be challenging. The volatility of output, inflation, the interest
rate, and the exchange rate has been higher than in developed coun-
tries. Several issues have led these economies to face this less favorable
trade-off. The process of building credibility, the necessity of reducing
inflation levels, the dominance issues, and the larger shocks have all
played an important role. To deal with this more volatile environment,
we recommend (1) high levels of communication and transparency, (2)
target bands treated mainly as communications devices, (3) a method-
ology for calculating the convergence path following a shock (adjusted
targets), and (4) better IMF conditionality under inflation targeting.
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Comment
ROBERT E. HALL
Stanford University and NBER
A nation dealing with its central bank is a leading example of principal-
agent mechanism design in an imperfectly understood environment. As
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this interesting paper shows, the problems are tougher in an emerging
market economy such as Brazil, especially during the transition toward
freer markets.
The central bank seeks to deliver low average inflation, but it will
inevitably miss its inflation target at times—often for good reasons. The
challenge is to design rules and incentives that achieve the general goal
but do not impose unrealistic harsh penalties when an event stands in the
way of the immediate achievement of the goal. Whiffs of inflation should
be excused if they arise for good reasons rather than dereliction.
Flexible inflation targeting has a good reputation these days as the cor-
rect way for citizens to manage their central bank. Commitment to strict
rules such as pegging the currency to another country's or a discretion-free
Taylor rule has not fared well in practice, and modern analysis suggests
that strict rules could never perform satisfactorily. These problems do not
occur if instead, the central bank should be given an overall inflation tar-
get and be expected to achieve the target unless some extraordinary event
occurs outside the bank's control; in which case, the bank should explain
why it missed its target and on what path it will return to the target.
Brazil has operated under a wonderfully flexible inflation-targeting
regime for several years, as we learn in this paper. The current overall tar-
get is 4% per year. Current inflation in Brazil is about 14%. Is this 1970s-
style central-bank irresponsibility, or is the 10-percentage-point gap the
result of an intelligent response to special circumstances?
Table 8 of the paper lays out a formula by which the citizens of Brazil
can decide if 14% inflation is acceptable under the 4% target regime,
shown in line (a). Line (b) gives the bank 1.7 percentage points of slack
because of rising prices associated with liberalization—the removal of
subsidies that kept some prices unrealistically low. Line (c) grants the
bank 2.8 more percentage points of slack because of excess inflation in the
previous year. Whatever excess is brought over by way of inertia from
the previous year, only one-third is to be squeezed out this year. The rest
will wait until future years. The logic is that erasing all inherited inflation
immediately would depress real activity excessively.
Table 8 would permit 8.5% inflation, not the actual rate of 14%. The
remaining 5.5 percentage points are explained in Figure 9. The target
applies at the end of the year. Forecasted inflation from December 2002 to
December 2003 is on target, at 8.5%, because the forecast calls for a rapid
decline in inflation in the fall of 2003. By the time this volume is in print,
the Brazilian public will know if the target was actually met.
The paper makes a compelling argument in favor of the flexibility of the
formula underlying the Brazilian process for adjusting the target.
Liberalization is creating highly desirable turbulence in the economy,
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which needs to be recognized in setting inflation targets. And the insta-
bility of exchange rates in emerging market economies also differentiates
them from the advanced economies, such as Britain, which have much
tighter inflation targets.
The paper is equally compelling about the desirability of adjusting the
target to account for special forces rather than adjusting the price index.
Public acceptance of the targeting procedure is surely weakened if the
products whose prices rise most rapidly are removed from the official
price index. I think this argument also extends to advanced economies—
the use of core or stripped inflation measures had a lot to do with the loss
of control of the price level in the United States in the 1970s, for example.
The complexity and sophistication underlying Table 8 are remarkable.
In the 1980s, when I dabbled in monetary policy and inflation-targeting
rules, I would not have dreamt of proposing something as academic as
the procedure embodied in line (c) of the table.
It's fascinating that Brazil has so far outstripped the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), which is living in the deep past by trying to
enforce inflation targets through limits on the growth of liquid assets.
Because successful disinflations are almost always accompanied by large
increases in the holdings of liquid assets, the IMF policy is perverse. I'm
delighted to learn that the Brazilian team was able to talk the IMF out of
this type of discredited policy.
The Brazilian public faces a difficult task in deciding if the gap between
target and actual current performance is the result of diligence in follow-
ing the rules or is misconduct. The public may find the logic behind Table
8 and Figure 9 a contrivance to hide bad performance. On the one hand,
the process will be less subject to manipulation if the rules for granting
exceptions are well established in advance—the basic logic of committed
monetary policy rules. On the other hand, painful experience has demon-
strated the need to keep the process flexible so that the economy can deal
with the blow that comes from an utterly unexpected direction.
The authors share the enthusiasm for transparency that pervades the
modern literature on monetary policy. The public needs to know what the
central bank is doing now, what it plans to do in the future, and what it
expects the resulting inflation rate to be. I'm impressed by this logic. But
I'm also impressed by the success of the U.S. Federal Reserve in achieving
desirably low inflation under a regime with almost total opacity. It
appears that a small amount of actual performance substitutes for a great
deal of transparency.
Many commentators on monetary policy have pointed to the benefit of
testing monetary policy against outside forecasts of inflation. Figure 9 illus-
trates the potential value of these forecasts. The bank's claim that it is enti-
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tied to the extra 5.5 percentage points of slack rests on the realism of the
forecast. Certainly, in the United States, comparison to the consensus or to
individual reputable inflation forecasts would prevent the Fed from taking
an unrealistic position about future inflation should our economy find itself
in the situation of the recent Brazilian economy, which suffered from simul-
taneous large shocks from currency depreciation and liberalization.
Comment
FREDERIC S. MISHKIN
Columbia University and NBER
The paper by Arminio Fraga, Ilan Goldfajn, and Andre Minella is a
thoughtful and important paper on inflation targeting in emerging mar-
ket economies. Not only does it add substantially to the literature on how
to conduct monetary policy in these economies, but as I will argue below,
it has important lessons for monetary policy in advanced economies.
Because I have so little to be critical about, my comments will focus on
expanding some themes discussed in the paper. Specifically, first, I will
examine why emerging market economies are so different from advanced
economies and why this affects thinking about monetary policy. Then I
will address several issues for inflation targeting in emerging market
economies discussed in the paper: target bands, transparency and for-
mality, response to shocks, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) con-
ditionality.
1. Why Emerging Market Economies Are So Different from
Advanced Economies
This paper, along with a recent paper I have written with Guillermo Calvo
(Calvo and Mishkin, 2003), rightfully emphasizes that emerging market
economies (EMEs) are fundamentally different from advanced
economies, and this distinction is important in designing appropriate
monetary policy regimes. EMEs have five fundamental institutional dif-
ferences from advanced economies that are crucial to sound theory and
policy advice:
1. Weak fiscal institutions (what the paper refers to as "fiscal domi-
nance").
2. Weak financial institutions, including government prudential regulation
and supervision (what the paper refers to as "financial dominance").
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3. Low credibility of monetary institutions.
4. Liability dollarization.
5. Vulnerability to sudden stops of capital inflows (what the paper refers
to as "external dominance").
Advanced countries are not immune to problems with their fiscal,
financial, and monetary institutions (the first three items in the list above),
but there is a major difference in the degree of the problem in EMEs. Weak
fiscal, financial, and monetary institutions make emerging market coun-
tries vulnerable to high inflation and currency crises, which are not only
a source of high volatility but also mean that the real value of domestic
money cannot be taken for granted. As a result, EMEs have much of their
debt denominated in foreign currency, usually dollars, hence leading to
what is called liability dollarization. As (Mishkin, 1996) and Calvo (2001)
have pointed out, liability dollarization is what leads to an entirely differ-
ent impact of currency crises on the economy in emerging market versus
advanced countries. In emerging market countries, a sharp real currency
depreciation raises the value of liabilities in local currency, thus causing
the net worth of corporations and individuals, especially those whose
earnings come from the nontradables sector, to fall. This serious negative
shock to corporations' and individuals' balance sheets then increases
asymmetric information problems in credit markets, leading to a sharp
decline in lending and an economic contraction. It should be noted, how-
ever, that not all emerging market countries (e.g., Chile, and South Africa)
suffer from liability dollarization in a serious way (see Eichengreen,
Hausmann, and Panizza, 2002).
A dominant phenomenon in emerging market countries is a sudden
stop, a large negative change in capital inflows, which appear, as a gen-
eral rule, to contain a large unanticipated component (see Calvo and
Reinhart, 2000). It is more likely to hit EMEs because of their weak fiscal
and financial institutions, and a sudden stop leads to a sharp contraction
of investment and the aggregate economy. The effect of sudden stops on
individual countries is by no means uniform and appears to have much
to do with initial conditions. For example, Chile had low debt relative to
Argentina and did not suffer from liability dollarization, and thus was
much less affected by the sudden stop in 1997-1998 than was Argentina,
which suffered a serious dislocation.
This paper illustrates that these institutional differences result in a
much more complicated environment for executing monetary policy by
conducting illustrative simulations using a dynamic new Keynesian
model. These simulations show that low credibility of monetary institu-
tions leads to slower convergence of inflation to targeted levels and a
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higher cost of disinflation. In addition, low credibility leads to higher
volatility of inflation, output, and interest rates. The simulations also
show that sudden stops, as represented by an exchange-rate shock, also
lead to higher volatility of inflation output and interest rates.
One conclusion from the above discussion is that institutional reforms
are especially critical to successful macroeconomic performance in EMEs.
Rounding up the usual suspects provides the following list: (1) improve-
ments in prudential supervision, (2) limits on the government safety net
for the financial system, (3) discouragement of currency mismatch for the
economy as a whole, (4) increased trade openness, (5) improvements in
fiscal relationships between the central government and the provinces
and increases in fiscal transparency, and (6) public/institutional commit-
ments to price stability and central bank independence. I will not discuss
these institutional reforms here because that would take my discussion to
far afield. I do want to emphasize, however, that fundamental institu-
tional reform is far more critical to macroeconomic success than is the
choice of monetary policy regime (a point emphasized in Calvo and
Mishkin [2003]). Inflation targeting or other monetary policy regimes,
including hard exchange rate pegs such as a currency board or dollariza-
tion, are not a panacea.
Central banks in EMEs can encourage institutional reform, and the
Banco Central do Brasil has been active in this regard. A central bank in
an EME can only do so much, however, and it has to take weak institu-
tions as given in deciding how to conduct monetary policy. The bottom
line is that being a central banker is much tougher in EMEs than it is in
advanced economies.
2. Issues in Inflation Targeting in EMEs
The tougher institutional environment that central bankers in EMEs
face is important in policy design with regard to four issues discussed in
the paper: target bands, transparency and formality, response to shocks,
and IMF conditionality.
2.1 TARGET BANDS
The paper advocates target bands for inflation targets that are wide to
accommodate the higher volatility in EMEs and suggests that the bands
should be seen as checkpoints. Although the paper's position on these
issues is reasonable, there is a subtlety here that needs to be emphasized.
The use of target bands has a dangerous aspect. Floors and ceilings of
bands can take on a life of their own in which there is too great a focus on
the breach of the floor or ceiling rather than on how far away actual inflation
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is from the midpoint of the target range. As discussed in Bernanke et al.
(1999) and Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002), too great a focus on
breaches of the floors or ceilings can lead to the so-called instrument insta-
bility problem, in which the attempts of policymakers to keep inflation
within the target range cause policy instruments, such as short-term inter-
est rates or exchange rates, to undergo undesirably large fluctuations. A
focus on avoiding short-term breaches of the bands can also lead to sub-
optimal setting of monetary policy and controllability problems in which
the inflation target is more likely to be missed in the medium term. Both
of these problems have arisen in the New Zealand inflation-targeting
regime.
One solution to these problems is to use a point target rather than a tar-
get range. There is still a need, however, for a trigger mechanism to sup-
port accountability for the central bank. Indeed, this is exactly what the
Bank of England has done: it has a point target for inflation of 2% and the
requirement that if the inflation rate is more than 1 percentage point
above or below this target, then it has to issue a public letter to the gov-
ernment explaining why inflation has moved so far from the target, what
policy actions will be taken to deal with the situation, and what will be the
expected path of inflation back to the 2% target. This procedure puts the
focus on the midpoint of a target range and not too much on the edges of
the target range.
Having a wide target range with the edges of the range seen as check-
points, as advocated in the paper, can be consistent with the Bank of
England procedure and can avoid the problem of too much focus on the
edges of the range. However, this requires that the focus always stay on
the midpoint of the range and that the edges of the bands are interpreted
only as checkpoints and not hard targets that cannot be breached. I think
Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella are advocating this approach, but it is
important that EMEs be aware that the use of a target range requires some
sublety in the communication process to avoid instrument instability and
controllability problems.
2.2 TRANSPARENCY AND FORMALITY
This paper rightfully emphasizes that the weaker credibility of monetary
policy institutions in EMEs requires even more transparency and formal-
ity in the inflation-targeting regime than in advanced economies. Because
the public is more skeptical of monetary authorities in EMEs, the central
bank can strengthen its credibility by providing even more information to
the public with measures like the following: releasing minutes of central
bank deliberations quickly; publishing the central bank's forecasts; and
publishing a clear and frank inflation report that outlines the goals and
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limitations of monetary policy, how the numerical values of the inflation
targets are determined, how the targets are to be achieved, and the rea-
sons for deviations from the targets.
Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella also emphasize that a formal process for
monetary policy decisions with regularly scheduled meetings of a mone-
tary policy committee (which in turn has a high level of proper prepara-
tion and economic analysis) is not only crucial to effective decisionmaking
but is also crucial to establishing credibility for the central bank. This
point almost seems obvious, but as the authors emphasize, many central
banks in EMEs have not followed this procedure in the past.
It is important to note that the Banco Central do Brasil has been a leader
in advancing transparency and formality in EMEs. Before the Brazilian cen-
tral bank adopted inflation targeting, many central banks in EMEs were
skeptical that they could put in place a full-fledged inflation-targeting
regime with high levels of transparency and formality. This is one reason
that some of these central banks engaged in a gradual approach to imple-
menting inflation-targeting regimes, with the Bank of Mexico being a promi-
nent example. However, in 1999, the Banco Central do Brasil, under Arminio
Fraga, has paved the way for other central banks in EMEs by implementing
a full-fledged inflation-targeting regime with all the bells and whistles of
transparency and formality within four months of the initial announcement
of inflation targeting. This achievement was extraordinary and has helped
hasten the adoption of inflation targeting in many EMEs.
2.3 RESPONDING TO SHOCKS
A key theme of the paper is that EMEs face much bigger shocks than
advanced economies do, which complicates the conduct of monetary
policy. How should inflation-targeting central banks in EMEs respond to
shocks? When shocks drive inflation away from the target, what horizon
should be used for returning to the target? For Brazil, these questions
have not been academic: Brazil experienced a major exchange-rate shock
in 2002, prior to the election of the new president, that caused a major
overshoot of its inflation target.
The discussion in the paper on how to respond to shocks gets it exactly
right. The first point the paper makes is that the response to a shock and
the horizon over which the central bank plans to get the inflation rate back
on target depends on the nature and persistence of the shock. In other
words, an optimizing framework in which output and inflation fluctua-
tions are minimized requires that the horizon for hitting an inflation goal
is shock dependent. Thus, the procedure for responding to a shock
derived from an optimizing framework requires the following four steps:
(1) identify the nature and persistence of the shock; (2) estimate the
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first- and second-order effects of the shock, depending on the type of shock;
(3) calculate the optimal response, depending on weights on inflation ver-
sus output fluctuations in the central bank's objective function; and (4)
explain to the public why the particular path of inflation has been chosen.
The paper provides an excellent discussion of how the Banco Central
do Brasil has responded to a large shock when it adjusted its inflation tar-
gets in early 2003. First, the central bank estimated the regulated-price
shock to be 1.7%. Then taking into account the nature and the persistence
of past shocks, it estimated the inertia from past shocks to be 4.2%, of
which two-thirds was to be accepted, resulting in an additional adjust-
ment of 2.8%. Then the central bank added these two numbers to the pre-
viously announced target of 4% to get an adjusted inflation target for 2003
of 8.5% (4% + 1.7% + 2.8%). The adjusted target was then announced in an
open letter sent to the minister of finance in January 2003. The letter
explained that getting to the nonadjusted target of 4% too quickly would
entail far too high a loss of output. Specifically, the letter indicated that an
attempt to achieve an inflation rate of 6.5% in 2003 was expected to entail
a decline of 1.6% of gross domestic product (GDP), while trying to achieve
the nonadjusted target of 4% was expected to lead to an even larger
decline in GDP of 7.3%.
The procedure followed by the Banco Central do Brasil has several
important advantages and is a textbook case for central bank response to
shocks. First, the procedure has tremendous transparency, both in articu-
lating why the initial inflation target was missed and also in showing how
the central bank is responding to the shock and its plans to return to its
longrun inflation goal. This degree of transparency helps minimize the
loss of credibility from the missed target and the need to adjust the short-
term inflation target. Second, the central bank recognized that not adjust-
ing the inflation target was just not credible because the market and the
public clearly recognized that inflation would overshoot the initial target.
Thus, adjusting the target publicly was absolutely necessary to retain
credibility for the central bank because to do otherwise would have sig-
naled to the markets that the central bank was unwilling to be transpar-
ent. Third, by discussing alternative paths for the inflation rate and the
reasons that the particular path using the adjusted target was chosen, the
central bank could demonstrate that it is not what King (1996) has
referred to as an inflation nutter who cares only about controlling infla-
tion and not about output fluctuations. By its procedure of outlining that
lower inflation paths would lead to large output losses, the Banco Central
do Brasil demonstrated that it is not out of touch with the concerns of the
public because it indeed does care about output losses, just as the public
and the politicians do.
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2.4 LESSONS FOR ADVANCED COUNTRIES
Although the discussion in the paper and the experience of Banco Central
do Brasil in responding to shocks has important lessons for the conduct of
monetary policy in other EMEs, it also has important lessons for the con-
duct of monetary policy in advanced economies. Inflation-targeting cen-
tral banks in advanced economies have often adopted a horizon for their
inflation targets of two years or so, with the Bank of England being a
prominent example. This approach can give the impression that the hori-
zon for inflation targets is fixed, which could mean that inflation targeting
will not be flexible enough. After all, our models tell us that optimal mon-
etary policy will surely adjust the target horizon for inflation depending
on the nature and persistence of shocks, a key point made by the paper.
Indeed, critics of inflation targeting in advanced economies have pointed
to the rigidity of the inflation-targeting regimes with a fixed horizon as an
important reason for not adopting inflation targeting.
Until now, the use of a specific horizon like two years has not been a
problem for inflation targeting in advanced economies like the United
Kingdom because inflation has not been subject to big shocks and it has
remained close to the target level. In this case, having the horizon for the
target equal to the policy horizon (i.e., the time it takes for monetary pol-
icy to affect inflation), which is about two years, is consistent with optimal
monetary policy. As Svensson (1997) demonstrates, however, if the infla-
tion rate is shocked away from its long-run target, then the target horizon
should be longer than the policy horizon. Although this situation has not
occurred yet for inflation targeters in advanced economies, one day a big
shock to inflation will come (as it already has in Brazil). Then for monetary
policy to minimize output and inflation fluctuations optimally, the target
horizon will need to be longer than two years and to vary depending on
the nature of the shock.
Central banks in advanced economies are aware of this issue. For
example, in the United Kingdom, the inflation-targeting regime stipu-
lates that if inflation is knocked more that 1 percentage point away from
its target of 2%, then the Bank of England will specify the path of infla-
tion and the length of time that it will take to get back to the 2% target.
Thus, there is a provision for flexibility in which the target horizon can
be varied when big shocks hit the inflation process. There are two prob-
lems that may arise, however, when a big shock hits the economy. The
first is that the two-year horizon may have become so fixed in the mind
of the public and/or the central bank that the central bank may not
respond flexibly enough to a large shock. The second is that a big shock
may occur that the central bank expects will drive inflation outside the
band around the inflation target, but inflation is still within the band for
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the time being. Even though inflation is not yet outside the target range,
the two-year horizon for hitting the inflation targets is unlikely to
remain appropriate. Instead, the central bank will need to adopt a pro-
cedure like the Banco Central do Brasil has followed to set appropriate
policy instruments in which the horizon and path for inflation are
adjusted depending on the nature and persistence of the shock. This
kind of flexible response would be harder to accomplish if the fixed time
horizon is in place when inflation at first remains within the target range.
Because EMEs like Brazil have already been subjected to large
shocks that require changes in the horizon for inflation targets, they
illustrate that central banks in advanced economies have to take this
contingency into account when designing their inflation-targeting sys-
tems. A lesson in this paper is that to minimize output and inflation
fluctuations optimally, central banks in both advanced and emerging
market economies need to make it clear, even before it is necessary,
that the horizon for inflation targets needs to be flexible and will vary
depending on the nature and persistence of shocks, and that they will
be ready to use procedures like the one the Banco Central do Brasil has
followed recently.
Stating that they are ready to use a procedure like the one the Banco
Central do Brasil has used has another important advantage for central
banks in advanced as well as emerging market economies. A well-known
conundrum for central bankers in both advanced and emerging market
economies is that many of them don't like to talk about output fluctua-
tions when discussing monetary policy. They fear that doing so encour-
ages the public and the politicians to demand that the central bank focus
on fighting declines in output, with the result that the pursuit of the price
stability goal will be compromised. The problem with central banks
unwillingness to discuss output fluctuations is that the public may begin
to see the central bank as having different preferences than they do, which
can erode support for the central bank. By acknowledging that a proce-
dure like the one followed by the Banco Central do Brasil will be used
when large shocks hit the economy, a central bank can make it clear that
it does care about output fluctuations and is not an inflation nutter. This
approach has the advantage that it will promote support for central bank
independence and the inflation-targeting regime. It also shows that the
central bank cares about output fluctuations in a forward-looking context
because it highlights decisions that the central bank will make about the
future path of inflation and the horizon over which inflation will return to
target. It therefore clarifies that the central bank is focusing on output fluc-
tuations in a long-term context, which is necessary for avoiding the time-
inconsistency problem.
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2.5 IMF CONDITIONALITY
The paper contains a brief section on IMF conditionality and I have a few
comments about this topic. When a country obtains loans under an IMF
program, it is subject to conditions that require evaluation of the mone-
tary policy stance. In the past, a key element of this conditionality was
ceilings on the growth rate of net domestic assets. As pointed out by
Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella, conditionality based on net domestic assets
makes little sense in an inflation-targeting regime. Net domestic assets
conditionality, which is derived under the IMF's financial programming
framework, is based on an outdated theory: the monetary approach to the
balance of payments (see Mussa and Savastano, 1999), which requires that
the growth rate of monetary aggregates be closely linked to inflation.
However, the linkage between monetary aggregates and inflation is
almost always found to be weak when inflation rates are reasonably low,
as is the case for EMEs that have adopted inflation targeting. As a result,
targets for net domestic assets are likely to lead to the inappropriate set-
ting of monetary policy instruments and are likely to decrease monetary
policy transparency.
In an inflation-targeting regime, it seems natural to replace net domes-
tic asset conditionality with assessment of the country's inflation per-
formance. Indeed, this is what the IMF moved to in evaluating monetary
policy under its program for Brazil when inflation targeting was adopted
in 1999. The IMF program has conducted quarterly reviews on Brazil's
performance in meeting its inflation targets, but there is still a problem
that the IMF evaluation is essentially backward-looking (Blejer, Leone,
Rabanal, and Schwartz, 2001). Inflation targeting is inherently forward-
looking, so how can IMF conditionality be modified to be more forward-
looking? One approach would be for the IMF to monitor monetary policy
institutions. Specifically, the IMF conditions could focus on the degree of
central bank independence, whether the central bank mandate focuses on
price stability as the long-run overriding goal of monetary policy, and
whether transparency and accountability of the central bank is high. As
part of this monitoring, the IMF could conduct a careful assessment of cen-
tral bank procedures, the legitimacy of its forecasting process and whether
the central bank provides adequate explanations for misses of its inflation
targets.
In a sense, this shift in approach is similar to the shift in approach that
has occurred in bank supervision in recent years. In the past, bank super-
vision was also quite backward-looking because it focused on the current
state of banks' balance sheets. However, this backward-looking approach
is no longer adequate in today's world, in which financial innovation has
produced new markets and instruments that make it easy for banks and
412 • MISHKIN
their employees to make huge bets easily and quickly. In this new finan-
cial environment, a bank that is quite healthy at a particular point in time
can be driven into insolvency extremely rapidly from trading losses, as
was forcefully demonstrated by the failure of Barings in 1995. Thus, bank
examinations have now become far more forward-looking and now place
much greater emphasis on evaluating the soundness of a bank's manage-
ment processes with regard to controlling risk. Similarly, the IMF could
shift its conditionality to focus on the management processes in central
banks to keep inflation under control.
3. Conclusion
The paper by Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella is important not only because
it has useful lessons for how inflation targeting should be conducted in
emerging market countries but also because it has valuable lessons for
advanced countries. The Banco Central do Brasil has been a leader in
developing best-practice inflation targeting for emerging market coun-
tries, sometimes under extremely difficult conditions.
This topic reminds me of an incident at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City's Jackson Hole conference, where top central bankers from
all over the world congregate every August. The recently departed Rudi
Dornbusch, who we all miss, made the provocative statement that
"there are no competent central bankers in Latin America." Of course,
what Dornbusch was getting at was that the environment for conduct-
ing effective monetary policy in Latin America is difficult, to say the
least. What this paper demonstrates is that, in fact, some of the most
competent central bankers are in Latin America, and we have a lot to
learn from them.
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Discussion
A number of participants asked for clarification on the conduct of mone-
tary policy by the Brazilian central bank. Mark Gertler noted that Alan
Greenspan spent his first years in charge of monetary policy, successfully
building his reputation. This situation could potentially be a problem,
however, if expectations about monetary policy and the reputation of the
Fed become tied to his personality. He asked whether the head of the cen-
tral bank in Brazil faced similar problems. He was skeptical that the pub-
lication of details of state-contingent targets could successfully substitute
for the reputation of Arminio Fraga, speculating that there might be
considerable leeway for discretion within the published targets. Gertler
asked whether the target paths published by the Brazilian central bank
are based on specific models or on individual judgement. Arminio Fraga
responded that the fact that there is room for discretion makes trans-
parency extremely important, and thus it is important that the specific
models used to generate the target paths are published. Ken Rogoff spec-
ulated that if target inflation rates in emerging markets were to reflect the
size of the shocks those countries are likely to face, the target rates should
be substantially higher. Arminio Fraga responded that the Brazilian cen-
tral bank gave a good deal of thought to this issue. He noted that the
central bank had not wanted the target to be high enough to include
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expectations of a violent change in regime because this consideration
might have triggered indexation clauses. Andres Velasco suggested an
alternative approach to accommodating big supply shocks in emerging
markets without loss of credibility. He suggested that the central bank
focus only on the element of the price level that does not depend on the
exchange rate. He was curious about why the Brazilian central bank had
not followed this approach. Arminio Fraga responded that the exchange
rate affects all sectors of the economy and also that the exchange rate may
be driven by the usual type of fundamentals as well as by supply shocks.
Arminio Fraga disagreed with the proposal in Robert Hall's discussion
that the central bank explicitly announce its preferences. Among other
problems, he felt that this approach still leaves open issues of time con-
sistency and is difficult to explain to the public. However, he said that the
central bank of Brazil is still trying to refine its approach and is currently
thinking of explaining decisions in terms of a unit shock and how the
shock will be handled over time. Rick Mishkin was also of the view that
publishing the objective function of the central bank is not a sensible idea.
In response to Robert Hall's discussion of external forecasts, Arminio
Fraga said that outside forecasts tended to lag and that there was a lot of
herding behavior. Mike Woodford was not convinced that targeting
external forecasts would be better than targeting internal forecasts
because outsiders' beliefs about central bank credibility affect their fore-
casts, while the central bank has full information about its own credibil-
ity. However, he noted that external forecasts are useful to the central
bank forecasts as indicators of expected inflation. Robert Hall responded
that this comment was reasonable, but that his point was that central
banks shouldn't offer excuses; they should offer performance.
The difference in the challenges faced by monetary policy in develop-
ing and developed countries was discussed by several participants.
Arminio Fraga noted that a history of weak institutions makes managing
regime change more difficult in developing countries than it is in devel-
oped countries. In contrast to the events prior to Lula's election in Brazil,
the transition from Clinton to Bush in the United States did not pose any
problems for the Federal Reserve. Rick Mishkin agreed, noting that the
job of the central bank is made much more difficult if the fiscal authority
misbehaves. He pointed out that in the United States, the Fed benefits
greatly from a stable and favorable policy environment. By contrast, cen-
tral banks in developing countries have to work much harder on institu-
tionalization and transparency because the policy environment tends to
be much less favorable. Ken Rogoff remarked that Brazil's achievement in
bringing inflation under control was very significant, especially in light of
the fact that Brazil had experienced the second highest cumulative infla-
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tion rate of any country since 1970: over 1 quadrillion percent. He specu-
lated that, just as the Bundesbank seemed to have gained credibility from
Germany's hyperinflation history, Brazil's central bank might also be able
to benefit to some extent from the country's past.
A number of participants expressed the view that developed countries
could learn from Brazil's experience. Ken Rogoff was of the view that the
problem of credibility in monetary policy has not been solved, contrary to
what a lot of people think. He noted that high productivity growth in
recent years has made low inflation possible relatively painlessly. He
speculated that the combination of high debt-GDP ratios and the old-age
problem in Europe and Japan may incite these countries to inflate in the
future. Rogoff also remarked that the ratio of science to art in central
banking needs to be increased, and that the only difference between the
Fed's conduct of monetary policy in the 1970s and today is in its commu-
nications strategy. Rick Mishkin noted that, although it is hard for central
banks to explain technical details to the public, transparency about the
effect of the output gap on the inflation target is a good idea. He observed
that this topic is currently missing from the discussion of inflation target-
ing in advanced countries but could be crucial if a large shock does occur.
Mike Woodford supported Mishkin's comment that the paper offers les-
sons for developed countries with low inflation. In particular, he said that
a fixed horizon for achieving an inflation target is undesirable because the
horizon should clearly depend on the persistence and nature of the
shocks.
Carl Walsh noted that in the area of monetary economics, the inter-
change between policymakers and theory has been productive in the past
few years. He observed that the table of state-contingent paths used by
the Brazilian central bank to explain its actions can be interpreted as the
optimal targeting rule from Benigno and Woodford. He noted that diffi-
culty in explaining either the table or the rule is that the coefficients of the
reaction function depend on many structural parameters, about which
there is uncertainty. This situation makes it hard to be explicit or trans-
parent about how output affects the inflation target. In response to Carl
Walsh, Mike Woodford was optimistic that the Benigno and Woodford
paper provides a useful framework for framing justifications for devia-
tions from the target, particularly from the point of view of external mon-
itoring by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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